On the assumption of equal contributions in fingerprinting by Schaathun, HG
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 3, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2008 569
Fig. 3. Offset of the modulus of negative real zeroes caused by one gray-scale
value change.
is shown in Fig. 2(e) and we can observe that the tampered area was
accurately detected.
B. Fragility of Watermark to Pixel Perturbation
From our observation, the zero locations of the z-transform are very
sensitive to the value change of even a single pixel, which renders the
z-transform domain ideal for fragile watermarking. We have investi-
gated this property experimentally. We collected 1000 gray-scale nat-
ural images and calculated the negative real zeroes of the z-transform
of their pixel sequences as described in Section III. We then randomly
changed one pixel value in every sequence and calculated the ampli-
tudes of the offsets of the negative real zeroes, which are reported in
Fig. 3. It can be observed that even a single pixel’s change unavoidably
disturbs the zero locations. In addition, we found that 98% of the neg-
ative real zeroes tend to shift toward the unit circle and as illustrated in
Fig. 3, the distribution peaks at an offset of 0.18, which is enough to
change the watermark detection results.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discuss a novel fragile watermarking method based
on the z-transform domain. The watermark bits are embedded by slight
perturbation of the zero locations. The zeroes of the z-transform around
the unit circle are very sensitive to any change of the host image. This
important property provides the scheme with special sensitivity to any
alteration to the watermarked image and the ability of accurate local-
izing. In addition, the proposed method is more secure than normal
fragile watermarking techniques based on LSB embedding. Simulation
results confirmed the applicability of the proposed algorithm.
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On the Assumption of Equal Contributions
in Fingerprinting
Hans Georg Schaathun
Abstract—With a digital fingerprinting scheme, a vendor of digital copies
of copyrighted material marks each individual copy with a unique finger-
print. If an illegal copy appears, it can be traced back to one or more guilty
pirates due to this fingerprint. A coalition of pirates may combine their
copies to produce an unauthorized copy with a false, hybrid fingerprint.
It is often assumed in the literature that the members of the collusion will
make equal contributions to the hybrid fingerprint, because nobody will
accept an increased risk of being caught. We argue that no such assump-
tion is valid a priori, and we show that a published solution by Sebé and
Domingo–Ferrer can be broken by breaking the assumption.
Index Terms—Collusion-attack, collusion-secure code (CSC), digital fin-
gerprinting, scattering codes.
I. BACKGROUND
The problem of digital fingerprinting was introduced in [1] and has
received quite some attention following [2]. A vendor of digital copies
of copyrighted material wants to prevent unauthorized copying. Digital
fingerprinting makes it possible to trace the guilty user (pirate) when an
illegal copy is found. This is done by embedding a secret identification
mark (fingerprint) in each copy, making every copy unique.
Typically, a robust watermarking (WM) scheme is used to hide the
fingerprint in the file. WM schemes are designed to hide any message in
a file in such a way that they can be recovered, even after being subject
to noise, signal-processing operations, or even malicious attacks.
If a single pirate distributes unauthorized copies, they will carry his
or her fingerprint. If the vendor discovers the illegal copies, he or she
can trace them back to the pirate and prosecute him or her. However,
a collusion of users can compare their copies, and thereby find regions
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which differ and, hence, must be part of the fingerprint. A simple attack
is to cut and paste segments from their individual copies, to produce a
hybrid copy where the fingerprint does not match any of the colluders.
Many authors [3], [4] assume that a collusion will always make a
hybrid by combining equal shares from each of their fingerprints. This
is based on the idea that the more the user fingerprint resembles the
hybrid, the more likely the user is to be accused. Obviously, nobody
would accept a higher risk of being accused.
The assumption may be correct when the closest neighbor or corre-
lation decoding is used [3] but, in general, it is not valid. Obviously,
if we prove that the system is secure assuming a certain user behavior,
then we are sure that a malicious (and intelligent) user will find some
other behavior. This is illustrated by the scattering codes [5], and we
shall prove that they are indeed not secure when the users are not re-
stricted to equal contributions.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight how important it is in in-
formation security and not to jump to conclusions about user behavior.
Any statement about user behavior must be demonstrated based on the
actual system.
II. COLLUSION-SECURE CODES
A common model for fingerprinting combines a WM scheme with
a collusion-secure code (CSC) [3]. An (n;M)q code C is a set of M
words (c1; . . . ; cn) over a q-ary alphabet Q. Each user is associated
with a fingerprint (word) c 2 C . The file is divided into n segments,
and each symbol ci is embedded independently in a corresponding
segment.
The codeC is often viewed as an nM matrix called the codebook,
where the rows are codewords. Each column corresponds to a segment
of the file.
A collusion of t pirates will have a set P  C of fingerprints. We
will also think of P as an n  t matrix, and refer to columns of P .
A column i, 1  i  n, is detectable if more than one element of
Q occurs in column i of P . We will assume that the correspondence
between file segments and code columns is chosen pseudorandomly by
the vendor and kept secret [6]. Hence, the colluders have no means of
knowing which columns they detect.
By comparing their copies, the pirates are able to produce an unau-
thorized copy with a hybrid fingerprint x 2 Qn. The pirates choose an
attack function A : Qnt ! Qn, possibly stochastic, taking the pirate
fingerprints P as input and returning the hybrid fingerprint x.
The set of hybrid fingerprints producible by P is called the feasible
set FC(P). This restricts the attack function, so that A(P) 2 FC(P).
The most common model due to [2] assumes that
FC(P) = f(c1; . . . ; cn) : 8 i; 9 (x1; . . . ; xn) 2 P; xi = cig:
In other words, each symbol xi in the hybrid fingerprint x must occur
in the ith column of P . This is known as the marking assumption.
A tracing algorithm for the code C is any algorithm T : Qn ! fL :
L  Cg. The input is the hybrid fingerprint x from an unauthorized
copy, and the output L is a list of users who are accused of copyright
violation. If P is a set of pirate fingerprints and A is an attack function
producing x = A(P), then T is successful if L  P and L 6= ;. If
T is not successful, we say that there is an error. A (probabilistically)
CSC is one with a tracing algorithm with bounded error probability.
III. SCATTERING CODES (SC)
Scattering codes were introduced in [5] and [7] and used in conjunc-
tion with a simplex code to give a probabilistically three-secure code.
An alleged attack [8] was rebutted in [6].
The scattering code SC(r; t) is a probabilistic encoding of a single
bit. Each bit value is encoded as one out of t possible words, chosen
TABLE I
SCATTERING CODE SC(4; 3)
TABLE II
THREE PIRATE CODEWORDS
uniformly at random. The code has 2t+1 distinct columns replicated r
times. We divide the columns into three zones. Zone A has r identical
columns where a word has one if and only if it encodes one. Zone B
has t distinct columns of weight one replicated r times, and all words
encoding zero are zero. Zone C is similar, with t distinct columns of
weight 1, and words encoding one are zero. Table I gives an example.
As part of the embedding, the fingerprint is XORed with a random,
secret bit string k. Similarly, the extracted hybrid fingerprint is XORed
withk before descattering. The effect of this is that the colluders cannot
tell whether a segment hides a 0 or a 1; they can only tell whether two
segments are different. (This randomization prevents the attack from
[8].)
Assuming that we detect a hybrid fingerprint produced by three col-
luders, the following decoding algorithm aims to recover a symbol seen
by at least two of the colluders.
Algorithm 1 (Descattering [5]): The decoding algorithm for scat-
tering codes (descattering) uses the first applicable rule in the following
list. One block is one set of r identical columns.
1) If there are at least two blocks of Zone B with at least one one-bit,
then decode as 1.
2) If there are at least two blocks of Zone C with at least one one-bit,
then decode as 0.
3) If there are more ones than zeroes in Zone A, then decode as 1.
4) If there are more zeroes than ones in Zone A, then decode as 0.
5) With the same number of zeroes and ones in Zone A, decode as
erasure.
It is easy to validate that the algorithm is always correct if the rows
of P encode the same bit. Table II shows a typical example where the
collusion sees two different bits. We can see that if the pirates use a mi-
nority choice strategy with high probability, they will probably output
at least one one-bit in each B1 and B2, and decoding rule 1 will cause
decoding to 1. If they use a majority choice strategy with high prob-
ability, they are likely to produce a majority of ones in block A, and
cause correct decoding of 1 by Rule 3. In the lemma as will be shown,
we will establish the exact probability of correct decoding.
In [7], attacks were considered where the colluders make indepen-
dent, random choices for each segment. We describe the strategy as
a tuple (p1; p2; p3) where pi is the probability that the attack outputs
the bit seen by two colluders (majority choice) in a column where col-
luder no. i differs from the other two. Due to the assumption of equal
contributions, [7] assumed p1 = p2 = p3. The following lemma is a
generalization of a result from [5] and [7]. The proof is a trivial exten-
sion of the original, but is included for completeness.
Lemma 1: Let a1, a2, and a3 be three codewords held by the collu-
sion, where ai encodes the opposite value of the other two codewords.
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Suppose the pirates pick the majority bit with probability pj in any
column where user j is the minority. Then, the probability of correct
descattering ri is given as
ri = 1 
1 + (t  1)
j 6=i
prj   j 6=i p
r
j
t
br=2c
j=0
r
j
pji (1 pi)
r j :
Proof: We prove the lemma for i = 3, assuming that a3 encodes
a 0. The general case follows by symmetry.
We consider first the case where a1 6= a2. Suppose the pirate code-
words are as depicted in Table II. In order to obtain a decoding error,
both Rule 1 and 3 have to fail. The first rule fails if least one of Block
B1 and B2 is all zero, and this occurs with probability
P1 = p
r
1 + p
r
2   p
r
1p
r
2:
The other rule fails if Zone A has a majority of zeros, which occurs
with probability
P3 =
br=2c
j=0
r
j
pi3(1  p3)
r j:
The two events are independent, so the error probability is P1  P3.
If a1 = a2, there is only one block Zone B, say B1, where the
pirates see two different bits. Hence, decoding Rule 1 always fails, and
we have a decoding error with probability P3.
For each bit, one of the t codewords is chosen uniformly at random.
Hence, P (a1 = a2) = 1=t, and we obtain the following total error
probability:
PE = P3 
(t  1)P1 + 1
t
which is equivalent to the formula in the theorem. Note that the error
probability increases in p1 and p2 and decreases in p3.
If p1 = p2 = p3 =: p, then clearly r1 = r2 = r3 =: (p)
by symmetry. The worst-case probability of successful descattering
p(r; t) := minp (p) is calculated in [5].
In [5], a scattering code S was concatenated with a simplex code C
as an outer code. In other words, each user was represented by a bi-
nary codeword c 2 C , and each bit of c was encoded using S. The
decoder would first descatter block by block, and then decode the re-
sulting vector with respect toC using closest neighbor decoding. It was
proved that if the descattering is successful with sufficiently high prob-
ability, then the error probability of the outer decoding can be made
arbitrarily close to 0. As we shall see, this result is only valid for strate-
gies (p; p; p).
Remark 1: Closest neighbor decoding invariably returns one and
only one codeword which is accused. There is no distinction between
false negatives and false positives. An error means that the returned user
is innocent, and both a false positive and a false negative are implied.
If the returned user is guilty, we say that decoding is correct, but there
are still two unidentified members of the collusion (false negatives).
We can view the outer code as a fingerprinting code in itself. For a
column of C where colluder i has a fingerprint different from the other
two, we can define a probability ri that the resulting hybrid fingerprint
after descattering matches the other two colluders. This is the prob-
ability ri given in Lemma 1. In effect, we obtain a colluder strategy
(r1; r2; r3) with respect to the outer code.
Theorem 1: A fingerprinting scheme with scattering inner codes and
a linear outer code has an error rate of at least 1/4 if the pirates use an
optimal strategy, regardless of the outer decoding algorithm used.
TABLE III
EXAMPLE OF THE STRATEGIES IN THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In particular, the simplex code C is linear. In the case of list de-
coding, an error rate of 25% means that, on average, 25% of all accused
codewords are false positives.
Proof: We propose a mixed strategy where the colluders
choose a pure strategy (p1; p2; p3) uniformly at random from
f(1;1; 1); (1; 0; 0); (0; 1; 0); (0; 0; 1)g. Observe that each of these
four strategies gives (r1; r2; r3) = (p1; p2; p3).
Consider three linearly independent codewords c1, c2, c3, and c4 =
c1+c2+c3. By linearity, c4 2 C . Any collusion of three out of these
four codewords by using our proposed strategy will produce the same
four false fingerprints with equal probabilities. Hence, when one of
these false fingerprints is detected, there are four users who are equally
likely to be guilty and one of them is innocent.
Example 1: Table III shows an example of the strategies used in the
proof. Since the attack works independently on each column, we have
truncated the codewords to display each column type (up to equiva-
lence) once. The first column shows the four codewords, and each row
then shows the four hybrid words generated when the corresponding
user is innocent (by the other three codewords). Note that each code-
word that the decoder can observe appears once in each row. Conse-
quently, any one of the four users may be innocent.
Remark 2: The problem with the original construction is clearly in
the outer code. Our attack only works because the outer code is linear.
It was proved in [9] and [10] that a secure construction can be made
by using a nonlinear outer code (so-called (2; 2)- and (3; 1)-separating
codes). Unfortunately, the rate of such a code is inferior to other codes
in the literature and, therefore, we have omitted the details.
IV. CLOSING WORDS
We conclude that the fingerprinting code of [7] is broken if the col-
luders refuse to accept the assumption of equal contributions, and an
optimal attack gives an error rate of at least 25%. This proves that the
assumption of equal contributions is not valid in general, and it is wor-
risome that this assumption is so often accepted in the literature (e.g.,
[4]) without argument.
It is an open question to check the assumption for other proposed so-
lutions where it has been applied. In many cases, it can almost certainly
be proved that an optimal attack exists where equal contributions are
used, but then this would be a property of the particular fingerprinting
scheme and not of the fingerprinting model.
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A Selective Feature Information Approach for Iris
Image-Quality Measure
Craig Belcher and Yingzi Du
Abstract—Poor quality images can significantly affect the accuracy of
iris-recognition systems because they do not have enough feature informa-
tion. However, existing quality measures have focused on parameters or
factors other than feature information. The quality of feature available for
measure is a combination of the distinctiveness of the iris region and the
amount of iris region available. Some irises may only have a small area of
changing patterns. Due to this, the proposed approach automatically se-
lects the portions of the iris with the most distinguishable changing pat-
terns to measure the feature information. The combination of occlusion
and dilation determines the amount of iris region available and is consid-
ered in the proposed quality measure. The quality score is the fused re-
sult of the feature information score, the occlusion score, and the dilation
score. The relationship between the quality score and recognition accu-
racy is evaluated using 2-D Gabor and 1-D Log-Gabor wavelet approaches
and validated using a diverse data set. In addition, the proposed method is
compared with the convolution matrix, spectrum energy, and Mexican hat
wavelet methods. These three methods represent a variety of approaches
for iris-quality measure. The experimental results show that the proposed
quality score is highly correlated with the recognition accuracy and is ca-
pable of predicting the recognition results.
Index Terms—Biometrics, feature information, iris-quality measure, iris
recognition.
I. INTRODUCTION
P OOR quality images can significantly reduce the accuracy ofiris-recognition systems [1]–[13]. It has been shown that the per-
formance of iris-recognition systems can be improved when quality is
considered [2], [3], [5], [7]. Many factors can affect the quality of an iris
image, including defocus, motion blur, occlusion, dilation, glare, reso-
lution, image contrast, and iris deformation. Noncooperative iris-recog-
nition systems are more susceptible to quality problems, but even co-
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operative systems can capture iris images of varying quality that are
affected by these quality problems. Some quality methods have been
adapted to improve the quality of acquired iris images [2] in the hard-
ware level. These approaches are good for quickly eliminating very
poor quality images, but even images capable of accurate segmenta-
tion can be assigned varying levels of quality as some iris images are
naturally more discriminating than others.
Daugman [2] analyzed the optical defocus model and proposed an
8 8 convolution kernel to fast assess the focus of an iris image. It acts
as a bandpass filter. Ma et al. [7] used the frequency energy distribu-
tion of two iris subregions in the horizontal direction to measure the
image quality. The support vector machine (SVM) was used to classify
the images into two categories (good and bad) based on low–, middle-,
and high-frequency energy levels. Chen et al. [5] divided the entire iris
region into eight concentric bands and measured the frequency content
using a Mexican hat wavelet. The quality score of the entire iris image
is the weighted average of the quality scores of individual bands. The
bands closer to the pupil are given a higher weight. This approach has
good spatial adaptivity based on local image quality [5]. Kalka et al. [6]
proposed using the Dempster–Shafer theory to combine several quality
measures, includingdefocus,motionblur,occlusion, specular reflection,
lighting, off angle, and pixel counts. This method improves over other
methods by using multiple parameters, and the defocus quality mea-
sure uses Daugman’s 8 8 convolution matrix in the iris region. Other
quality measures include Zhang and Salganicoff’s sharpness measure
for focus [10] and Zhu et al.’s iris texture analysis [11].
Poor quality images cannot generate satisfactory recognition be-
cause they do not have enough feature information, which has not
been well considered in these quality measures. Iris recognition is
dependent on the amount of information available in two iris images
being compared. The quality of feature available for measure is a
combination of the distinctiveness of the iris region and the amount of
iris region available.
In [12], we proposed the clarity measure by comparing the informa-
tion loss from the original features to blurred versions of the same fea-
tures. This approach can only work on iris images with a small amount
of occlusion. In addition, it is very sensitive to segmentation error.
In this paper, we propose a selective feature information approach
for iris-quality measure that evaluates the available distinctive feature
information. The experimental results show that the proposed quality
measure is highly correlated with the recognition accuracy. Therefore,
it can be used to determine the confidence level of matching scores.
When two images are compared, it is possible for two low-quality im-
ages to have a high matching score and be from different eyes or have a
low matching score and be from the same eye. A confidence score can
be used to support matching results by allowing a system to only focus
on matching scores that meet some confidence level. Two iris-recogni-
tion algorithms are used to evaluate the proposed quality measure: 2-D
Gabor wavelet method proposed by Daugman [2] and 1-D Log-Gabor
wavelet method proposed by Masek and Kovesi [14] with our improve-
ment [18]. The proposed method is compared with other methods [2],
[5], [7] over three public databases: 1) CASIA ver. 2.0 [15]; 2) ICE
2005 [16]; and 3) the West Virginia University (WVU) database [23].
The experimental results show that the proposed method is effective.
II. SELECTIVE FEATURE INFORMATION-BASED
IRIS IMAGE-QUALITY MEASURE
A. Preprocessing
The acquired iris image includes pupil, eyelids, eyelashes, sclera,
and some skin of the eye as well as iris. The first step is to preprocess
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